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Abstract. As a one-to-many public key encryption system, attribute-
based encryption (ABE) enables scalable access control over encrypted
data in cloud storage services. However, eﬃcient user revocation has been
a very challenging problem in ABE. To address this issue, Boldyreva,
Goyal and Kumar [5] introduced a revocation method by combining the
binary tree data structure with fuzzy identity-based encryption, in which
a key generation center (KGC) periodically broadcasts key update infor-
mation to all data users over a public channel. The Boldyreva-Goyal-
Kumar approach reduces the size of key updates from linear to logarithm
in the number of users, and it has been widely used in subsequent revo-
cable ABE systems; however, it requires each data user to keep a private
key of logarithmic size and all non-revoked data users to periodically
update decryption keys for each new time period. To further optimize
user revocation in ABE, in this paper, we propose a notion called server-
aided revocable ABE (SR-ABE), in which almost all workloads of data
users incurred by user revocation are delegated to an untrusted server
and each data user only needs to store a key of constant size. We then
deﬁne a security model for SR-ABE, and present a concrete SR-ABE
scheme secure under this model. Interestingly, due to the key embedding
gadget employed in the construction of SR-ABE, our SR-ABE scheme
does not require any secure channels for key transmission, and also enjoys
an additional property in the decryption phase, where a data user only
needs to perform one exponentiation computation to decrypt a cipher-
text.
Keywords: Revocation · Attribute-based encryption · Server-aided
1 Introduction
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) [22] is a promising solution to preserve data
privacy in scenarios where data users are identiﬁed by their attributes (or creden-
tials) and data owners want to share their data stored in the cloud with data users
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whose attributes satisfy a certain access structure (or policy). In a ciphertext-
policy ABE (CP-ABE) system, a trusted key generation center (KGC) issues a
private key for every data user corresponding to his/her attribute set, and each
data owner speciﬁes an access policy over an attribute set to an encrypted mes-
sage1. A data user is able to decrypt a ciphertext if the attribute set associated
with his/her private key satisﬁes the access policy ascribed to the ciphertext.
Since an ABE system may involve a large number of data users, eﬃcient
user revocation, due to either private key compromises or user resignations, has
been regarded as a very important and challenging problem. Boldyreva, Goyal
and Kumar [5] put forth an eﬃcient revocation method by combining the fuzzy
identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme [22] with the binary tree data struc-
ture [18], where the KGC issues a long-term private key to each data user and
publicly broadcasts key updates at the beginning of each time period, but only
non-revoked data users can generate decryption keys from their long-term private
keys and the key updates to decrypt the newly created ciphertexts. The revocable
ABE schemes in [1,5,9,21] following the Boldyreva-Goyal-Kumar approach miti-
gate the KGC’s communication overhead incurred in the key update process, but
they fail to reduce the workloads of data users since every data user is required
to keep a private key of logarithmic size and all non-revoked data users need to
periodically update decryption keys to decrypt newly encrypted data. Regard-
ing this crux, Qin et al. [19] proposed a solution in identity-based encryption,
called server-aided revocable identity-based encryption (SR-IBE), where almost
all workloads on data users are delegated to a untrusted server who manages
data users’ public keys and key updates sent by the KGC periodically, and each
data user keeps just one private key of constant size (i.e., O(1)) and are not
required to communicate with either the KGC or the untrusted server during
the key update phase. However, this problem has not caught suﬃcient attention
in the attribute-based setting.
1.1 Our Contributions
Motivated by SR-IBE in [19], we put forth a notion called server-aided revocable
ABE (SR-ABE) to accomplish eﬃcient and secure user revocation in ABE. The
architecture of an SR-ABE scheme is depicted in Fig. 1 under the scenario of
cloud storage [24]. The architecture consists of four types of entities: a KGC, data
owners, data users and an untrusted server2. Note that the untrusted server could
be operated by anyone, including the cloud storage system. The KGC possesses
a master private key, and publishes its public parameter. When a new data user,
1 There are two complimentary forms of ABE: CP-ABE and key-policy ABE (KP-
ABE). In a KP-ABE system, the situation is reversed in that a private key is asso-
ciated with an access policy and a ciphertext is associated with a set of attributes.
In the rest of the paper, unless otherwise speciﬁed, we will focus on CP-ABE.
2 The server is untrusted in the sense that it honestly follows the protocol, but does not
hold any secret information (i.e., it may collude with data users), and all operations
done by the server can be performed by anyone, including data users (i.e., any
dishonest behaviour from the server can be easily detected).
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say Alice, joins the system, she ﬁrst generates a public and private user-key
pair by herself. She keeps the private user-key to herself and sends the public
user-key (along with a proof showing that she knows the corresponding private
user-key) to the KGC, which, based on Alice’s public user-key and attributes,
generates a public attribute-key for Alice and sends it to the untrusted server.
Also, the KGC periodically generates key updates for all non-revoked data users
and publicly transmits them to the untrusted server. The same as that in the
standard CP-ABE, to upload a message in the current time period to the cloud,
a data owner encrypts the message over an access structure and a time period
using the system public parameter, and outsources the resulting ciphertext to
the cloud. To decrypt a ciphertext, a data user forwards the ciphertext to the
untrusted server. If the data user is not revoked and his/her set of attributes
satisﬁes the access structure ascribed to the ciphertext, the untrusted server
is able to generate a transformation key from his/her public attribute-key and
the key update information, with which the server can partially decrypt the
ciphertext. This partially decrypted ciphertext can be fully decrypted by the data
user using his/her private user-key. Notice that SR-ABE only requires all data
users to contact the KGC during the user registration phase, while operations
caused by user revocation are completely handled by the untrusted server and
are totally transparent to the data users.
Fig. 1. System architecture of server-aided revocable attribute-based encryption.
The key challenge in constructing an SR-ABE scheme is how to enable the
untrusted server to assist decryption while without knowing the underlying plain-
text. In an IBE system, each user has a unique identity and every ciphertext is
exclusively designated to one recipient. Therefore, in the SR-IBE scheme pre-
sented in [19], after the server partially decrypts a ciphertext for a data user,
the user can obtain the underlying plaintext using his/her identity-based private
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key. However, in an ABE scheme, the same attributes could be shared among
multiple users, so if using the master private key splitting methodology in [19] in
an SR-ABE scheme, given the partial decryption of a ciphertext by the untrusted
server, a data user would be able to fully decrypt the partially decrypted cipher-
text, regardless of the data user being revoked or not, as long as his/her set of
attributes satisﬁes the access structure in the ciphertext. To conquer this chal-
lenge, we equip each data user with a pair of self-generated public and private
user-keys3 (i.e., it does not require a secure channel for key transmission), and
then trickly embed the public user-key into the public attribute-key generated
by the KGC. As a result, the untrusted server can still partially decrypt cipher-
texts for non-revoked users, but every partially decrypted ciphertext is bound
with a public user-key, which can only be decrypted by the user possessing the
corresponding private user-key.
We deﬁne a security model for SR-ABE, which formalizes the possible real-
istic threats and takes into account all adversarial capabilities of the standard
ABE security notion. The adversary is able to learn private user-keys and public
attribute-keys of data users with attributes of its choice. The adversary should
not be able to learn any partial information about the message encrypted for the
challenge access structure. In addition, we consider the adversary having access
to periodic key updates, transformation keys for diﬀerent time periods and being
able to revoke users of its choice. The adversary should also not be able to learn
any partial information about the messages encrypted for any revoked data user
whose attributes satisfy the challenge access structure when the encryption is
done after the time of revocation.
Then we present a concrete SR-ABE construction for this model based on the
large universe CP-ABE scheme in the prime-order groups presented by Rouse-
lakis and Waters [20]. For the sake of building the SR-ABE scheme, we resort to
the technique in [23] and the binary tree data structure [18], and combine them
with the Rouselakis-Waters CP-ABE scheme [20]. In our SR-ABE scheme, com-
ponents corresponding to each attribute in a transformation key follow the form
of the second level private key of the HIBE scheme [6]. A technique similar to
that in [23] is used to generate the public attribute-keys and key updates, where
the master private key of the KGC is randomly divided into two parts and each
part is respectively bound to the public attribute-keys and key updates. Also, to
reduce the size of key updates from linear to logarithmic in the number of data
users, the binary tree data structure in [18] is used. We present the full details of
the construction in Sect. 4. It is worth noticing that though SR-ABE is derived
from SR-IBE, due to the gadget we employ in the public attribute-key genera-
tion algorithm, our SR-ABE construction enjoys two additional advantages that
the SR-IBE scheme in [19] does not have: (1) there is no need of secure channels
for the distribution of private keys, since they are generated by each data user
3 This user-key pair can also be generated and securely sent to the data user by the
KGC as that in [19], but this requires a secure channel between the data user and
the KGC for key distribution.
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himself/herself; (2) in the decryption phase, each privileged data user only needs
to perform one exponentiation computation and no pairing computation.
Since the Rouselakis-Waters CP-ABE scheme [20] is selectively secure, where
the adversary has to commit the challenge access structure in advance, our SR-
ABE scheme which is constructed based on [20] is also selectively secure. Note
that the techniques can be applied to fully secure ABE schemes (e.g., [21]) to
obtain fully secure server-aided ABE schemes.
In a nutshell, our contributions in this paper can be summarized as follows.
– We ﬁrst propose a notion called server-aided revocable attribute-based encryp-
tion (SR-ABE), in which almost all data users’ workloads incurred in key
update phase are delegated to an untrusted server and each data user only
needs to keep a private user-key of constant size for decryption.
– We deﬁne a security model for SR-ABE which considers all possible adversarial
behaviours that could be executed by an adversary in the real world.
– Due to the gadget employed in the construction of SR-ABE, our SR-ABE
scheme does not require any secure channels for key transmission, and enjoys
an additional property in the decryption phase, where a data user only needs
to perform one exponentiation computation to decrypt a ciphertext.
1.2 Related Work
Revocable IBE. Boneh and Franklin [8] suggested to renew users’ private
keys periodically to achieve user revocation in IBE, but this requires all users
to regularly contact the KGC over secure channels, regardless of whether their
keys have been exposed. That is, the size of key updates is linear in the number
of non-revoked users (i.e., O(N − R), where N is the number of all users and
R is the number of revoked users). Hanaoka et al. [11] presented a method for
users to periodically renew their private keys without interacting with the KGC,
where the KGC publicly posts the key update information; however, each user
needs to possess a tamper-resistant hardware device, making the solution rather
cumbersome. Boldyreva, Goyal and Kumar [5] presented an eﬃcient revocable
IBE scheme to reduce the size of key updates from linear to logarithmic (i.e.,
O(R log(NR ))) and remove the secure channels required during key updates, but
all non-revoked users still need to periodically update their private keys for
decryption. There are also revocable IBE schemes with a third party [3,7,10,14,
16,17,19], where a semi-trusted4 or untrusted third party is required to hold the
shares of all users’ private keys and help them decrypt. Once a user is revoked,
the third party stops decrypting (or is disallowed to decrypt) for the user.
Revocable ABE. Two kinds of user revocation mechanisms have been proposed
for revocable ABE [1,9]: direct and indirect revocation. In direct revocation,
data owners directly specify the revocation list when encrypting [2,12,15]. In
addition, Yang et al. [26] proposed a revocable ABE scheme by giving the direct
4 In this paper, unless otherwise speciﬁed, “semi-trusted” means that the party is
disallowed to collude with data users.
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revocation capability to a semi-trusted server who shares the decryption ability
with data users, and will terminate decryption operations for revoked users. In
indirect revocation, the KGC indirectly disables revoked users through a key
update process. Boldyreva, Goyal and Kumar [5] proposed a revocable KP-ABE
scheme following the indirect revocation approach, Attrapadung and Imai [1]
gave a hybrid revocable KP-ABE system which allows a data owner to select
either direct or indirect revocation when encrypting a message, Sahai, Seyalioglu
and Waters [21] provided a generic way to achieve indirect revocation in ABE
schemes, and Cui and Deng [9] gave two revocable ABE schemes in the setting
where the KGC’role is split across multiple KGCs.
Note that direct revocation can be done immediately without key updates,
but it requires all data owners to keep a current revocation list. This makes
the system impurely attribute-based, since data owners in the attribute-based
setting create a ciphertext based solely on attributes without caring each data
user’s status. In this paper, we focus on ABE with indirect revocation.
1.3 Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we brieﬂy review
the notions and deﬁnitions relevant to this paper. In Sect. 3, we describe the
framework of our SR-ABE, and then present its security model. In Sect. 4, we
give a concrete construction of SR-ABE, prove its security, and compare it with
previous revocable ABE schemes. We conclude the paper in Sect. 5.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we review the basic cryptographic deﬁnitions that are to be used
in this paper.
2.1 Bilinear Pairings and Complexity Assumptions
Let G be a group of order p generated from g, and p be a prime number. We
deﬁne eˆ : G×G → G1 to be a bilinear map if it has the following properties [8].
– Bilinear: for all g ∈ G, and a, b ∈ Z∗p , we have eˆ(ga, gb) = eˆ(g, g)ab.
– Non-degenerate: eˆ(g, g) = 1.
We say that G is a bilinear group if the group operation in G is eﬃciently
computable and there exists a group G1 and an eﬃciently computable bilinear
map eˆ : G × G → G1 as above.
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Decisional (q − 1) Assumption [20]. The decisional (q − 1) problem is that
for any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm, given −→y =
g, gμ, g1/a,
ga
i
, gbj , gμbj , ga
ibj , ga
i/b2j ∀ (i, j) ∈ [q, q],
ga
i/bj ∀ (i, j) ∈ [2q, q] with i = q + 1,
ga
ibj/b
2
j′ ∀ (i, j, j′) ∈ [2q, q, q] with j = j′,
gμa
ibj/bj′ , gμa
ibj/b
2
j′ ∀ (i, j, j′) ∈ [q, q, q] with j = j′,
it is diﬃcult to distinguish (−→y , eˆ(g, g)aq+1μ) from (−→y , Z), where g ∈ G, Z ∈ G1,
a, μ, b1, ..., bq ∈ Z∗p are chosen independently and uniformly at random.
2.2 Access Structures and Linear Secret Sharing
Definition 1 (Access Structure) [13,25]. Let {P1, ..., Pn} be a set of par-
ties. A collection A ⊆ 2{P1,...,Pn} is monotone if ∀B,C : if B ∈ A and B ⊆ C,
then C ⊆ A. A monotone access structure is a monotone collection A of non-
empty subsets of {P1, ..., Pn}, i.e., A ⊆ 2{P1,...,Pn}\{∅}. The sets in A are called
authorized sets, and the sets not in A are called unauthorized sets.
Definition 2 (Linear Secret Sharing Schemes (LSSS)) [13,25]. Let P
be a set of parties. Let M be a matrix of size l × n. Let ρ : {1, ..., l} → P be
a function that maps a row to a party for labeling. A secret sharing scheme Π
over a set of parties P is a linear secret-sharing scheme over Zp if
1. The shares for each party form a vector over Zp.
2. There exists a matrix M with l rows and n columns, called the share-
generating matrix, for Π. For x = 1, ..., l, the x-th row of matrix M is
labelled by a party ρ(i), where ρ : {1, ..., l} → P is a function that maps
a row to a party for labelling. Considering that the column vector −→v = (μ,
r2, ..., rn), where μ ∈ Zp is the secret to be shared and r2, ..., rn ∈ Zp are
randomly chosen, then M−→v is the vector of l shares of the secret μ according
to Π. The share (M−→v )i belongs to party ρ(i).
It has been noted in [13] that every LSSS also enjoys the linear reconstruction
property. Suppose that Π is an LSSS for an access structure A. Let A be an
authorized set, and deﬁne I ⊆ {1, ..., l} as I = {i|ρ(i) ∈ A}. Then the vector (1,
0, ..., 0) is in the span of rows of matrix M indexed by I, and there exist constants
{wi ∈ Zp}i∈I such that, for any valid shares {vi} of a secret μ according to Π,
we have
∑
i∈I wivi = μ. These constants {wi} can be found in polynomial time
with respect to the size of the share-generating matrix M [4].
On the other hand, for an unauthorized set A′, no such constants {wi} exist.
Moreover, in this case it is also true that if I ′ = {i|ρ(i) ∈ A′}, there exists a
vector −→w such that its ﬁrst component w1 is any non-zero element in Zp and
< Mi,
−→w > = 0 for all i ∈ I ′, where Mi is the i-th row of M [20].
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Boolean Formulas [13]. Access policies can also be described in terms of
monotonic boolean formulas. LSSS access structures are more general, and can be
derived from representations as boolean formulas. There are standard techniques
to convert any monotonic boolean formula into a corresponding LSSS matrix.
The boolean formula can be represented as an access tree, where the interior
nodes are AND and OR gates, and the leaf nodes correspond to attributes. The
number of rows in the corresponding LSSS matrix will be the same as the number
of leaf nodes in the access tree.
2.3 Binary Tree
We recall the deﬁnition about binary tree described in [5,19]. Denote BT by
a binary tree with N leaves corresponding to N users. Let root be the root
node of the tree BT. If θ is a leaf node, then Path(θ) denotes the set of nodes
on the path from θ to root, which includes both θ and root. If θ is a non-leaf
node, then θl, θr denote left and right child of θ. Assume that nodes in the
tree are uniquely encoded as strings, and the tree is deﬁned by all of its node
descriptions. The algorithm KUNodes is used to compute the minimal set of
nodes for which key update needs to be published so that only the non-revoked
users at a time period t are able to decrypt the ciphertexts. This algorithm
takes a binary tree BT, a revocation list rl and a time period t as the input, and
outputs a set of nodes which is the minimal set of nodes in BT such that none of
the nodes in rl with corresponding time period before or at t (users revoked at
or before t) have any ancestor (or, themselves) in the set, and all other leaf nodes
(corresponding to non-revoked users) have exactly one ancestor (or, themselves)
in the set. We give a pictorial depiction on how the KUNodes algorithm works
in Fig. 2, where it ﬁrstly marks all the ancestors of the revoked nodes as revoked,
and then it outputs all the non-revoked children of revoked nodes. Below is a
Fig. 2. A pictorial description about how the KUNodes algorithm works.
578 H. Cui et al.
formal deﬁnition of the KUNodes algorithm.
KUNodes(BT, rl, t)
X,Y ← ∅.
∀ (θi, ti) ∈ rl, if ti ≤ t, then add Path(θi) to X.
∀ x ∈ X, if xl /∈ X, then add xl to Y ; if xr /∈ X, then add xr to Y.
If Y = ∅, then add root to Y.
Return Y.
3 Framework and Security Model
In this section, we describe the framework and security deﬁnition of SR-ABE.
3.1 Framework
An SR-ABE scheme involves four types of entities: a key generation center
(KGC), data owners, data users and a untrusted server, and consists of nine
algorithms given below. We assume that the server keeps a list of tuples (iden-
tity, attribute set, public attribute-key), i.e., (id, A, pkAid).
– Setup(1λ) → (par, msk, rl, st). Taking a security parameter λ as the input,
this algorithm outputs the public parameter par, the master private key msk,
an initially empty revocation list rl and a state st. This algorithm is run by
the KGC.
– UserKG(par, id) → (skid, pkid). Taking the public parameter par and an
identity as the input, this algorithm outputs a public and private user-key
pair (skid, pkid). This algorithm is run by each data user.
– PubKG(par, msk, id, pkid, A, st) → (pkAid, st). Taking the public parameter
par, the master private key msk, an identity id with a public user-key pkid
and a set of attributes A, and a state st as the input, this algorithm outputs
a public attribute-key pkAid for user id possessing an attribute set A and an
updated state st. This algorithm is run by the KGC, and (pkAid, st) is sent to
the untrusted server.
– TKeyUp(par, msk, t, rl, st) → (tkut, st). Taking the public parameter par,
the master private key msk, a time period t, a revocation list rl and a state
st as the input, this algorithm outputs a key update message tkut and an
updated state st. This algorithm is run by the KGC, and (tkut, st) is sent to
the server.
– TranKG(par, id, pkAid, tkut) → tkid,t. Taking the public parameter par, an
identity id with the corresponding public attribute-key pkAid and a key update
message tkut as the input, this algorithm outputs a transformation key tkid,t
for user id in time period t. This algorithm is run by the server.
– Encrypt(par, (M, ρ), t, M) → CT. Taking the public parameter par, an access
structure (M, ρ), a time period t and a message M as the input, this algorithm
outputs a ciphertext CT. This algorithm is run by each data owner, and CT
will be stored in the cloud.
Server-Aided Revocable Attribute-Based Encryption 579
– Transform(par, id, A, tkid,t, CT) → CT′/⊥. Taking the public parameter
par, an identity id with the corresponding transformation key tkid,t and a
ciphertext CT as the input, this algorithm outputs either a partially decrypted
ciphertext CT′ when the attributes A associated with the transformation key
tkid,t satisﬁes the access structure of the ciphertext CT or ⊥ indicating the
failure of the transformation. This algorithm is run by the server. After the
partial decryption, CT′ is sent to the data user id.
– Decrypt(par, id, skid, CT′) → M/⊥. Taking the public parameter par, an
identity id with a private user-key skid and a transformed ciphertext CT′ as
the input, this algorithm outputs a message M or a failure symbol ⊥. This
algorithm is run by a data user id.
– Revoke(id, t, rl, st) → rl. Taking an identity id to be revoked, a time period t, a
revocation list rl and a state st, this algorithm outputs an updated revocation
list rl. This algorithm is run by the KGC.
The correctness of an SR-ABE scheme requires that for any security para-
meter λ and any message M , if the data user id is not revoked at time period t,
and if all parties follow the described algorithms as above, we have Decrypt(par,
skid, CT′) = M .
3.2 Security Model
Below we describe the security deﬁnition of indistinguishability under chosen
plaintext attacks (IND-CPA security) for SR-ABE between an adversary algo-
rithm A and a challenger algorithm B.
– Setup. Algorithm B runs the setup algorithm, and gives the public parameter
par to algorithm A, and keeps the master private key msk, an initially empty
revocation list rl and a state st.
– Phase 1. Algorithm A adaptively issues a sequence of following queries to
algorithm B.
• Private-User-Key oracle. Algorithm A issues a private user-key query on an
identity id. Algorithm B returns skid by running UserKG(par, id).
Note that once algorithm B runs UserKG(par, id), it adds (id, pkid, skid)
to a list so that the same (skid, pkid) is used for all queries on id.
• Public-Attribute-Key oracle. Algorithm A issues a public attribute-key
query on an identity id and an attribute set A. Algorithm B returns pkAid by
running UserKG(par, id) (if id has not been issued to the Private-User-Key
oracle), PubKG(par, msk, id, pkid, A, st).
• Transformation-Key-Update oracle. Algorithm A issues a key update query
on a time period t. Algorithm B runs TKeyUp(par, msk, t, rl, st) and
returns tkut.
• Transformation-Key oracle. Algorithm A issues a transformation key query
on a time period t and an identity id with an attribute set A. Algorithm B
returns tkid,t by running UserKG(par, id) (if id has not been issued to the
Private-User-Key oracle), PubKG(par, msk, id, pkid, A, st), TKeyUp(par,
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msk, t, rl, st), TranKG(par, id, pkAid, tkut). Note that this oracle cannot be
queried on a time period t before a transformation key update oracle has
been queried on t.
• Revocation oracle. Algorithm A issues a revocation query on an identity
id and a time period t. Algorithm B runs Revoke(id, t, rl, st) and out-
puts an updated revocation list rl.Note that a time period t on which a
transformation key update query has been issued cannot be issued to this
oracle.
– Challenge. Algorithm A outputs two messages M∗0 , M∗1 of the same size, an
access structure (M∗, ρ∗) and a time period t∗ satisfying the following con-
straints.
1. Case 1: if (1) an identity id∗ has been queried to the Private-User-Key
oracle, and (2) (M∗, ρ∗) can be satisﬁed by a query on (id∗, A∗) issued
to the Public-Attribute-Key oracle, then (1) the revocation oracle must
be queried on (id∗, t) on t = t∗ or any t occurs before t∗, and (2) the
Transformation-Key oracle cannot be queried on (id∗, t∗).
2. Case 2: if an identity id∗ whose attribute set A∗ can be satisﬁed by the
challenge access structure (M∗, ρ∗) is not revoked at or before t∗, then id∗
should not be previously queried to the Private-User-Key oracle.
Algorithm B randomly chooses γ ∈ {0, 1}, and forwards the challenge cipher-
text CT∗ to algorithm A by running Encrypt(par, (M∗, ρ∗), t∗, M∗γ ).
– Phase 2. Algorithm A continues issuing queries to algorithm B as in Phase 1,
following the restrictions deﬁned in the Challenge phase.
– Guess. Algorithm A makes a guess γ′ for γ, and it wins the game if γ′ = γ.
The advantage of algorithm A in this game is deﬁned as Pr[γ = γ′]−1/2. An
SR-ABE scheme is IND-CPA secure if any probabilistic polynomial time (PPT)
adversary has at most a negligible advantage in the security parameter λ. In
addition, an SR-ABE scheme is said to be selectively IND-CPA secure if an
Init stage is added before the Setup phase where algorithm A commits to the
challenge access structure (M∗, ρ∗) (and the challenge time period t∗) which it
attempts to attack.
Remark. Seo and Emura [23] deﬁned a security model to prevent a realistic
threat called decryption key exposure attacks such that no information of the
plaintext is revealed from a ciphertext even if all (short-term) decryption keys
of a “diﬀerent time period” are exposed, which the revocable ABE schemes
in [1,5,9,21] following the Boldyreva-Goyal-Kumar technique cannot resist5. To
cover such attacks in our IND-CPA security model, diﬀerent from those previous
security notions [1,5,9,21] in revocable ABE, the adversary in our CP-ABE
deﬁnition is given access to an additional Transformation-Key oracle, since the
decryption key generated by a data user in a normal ABE scheme is now created
by the server and renamed as transformation key in our SR-ABE scheme.
5 This does not contradict with the security proofs of these schemes, because such
attacks are excluded from their security models.
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4 Server-Aided Revocable Attribute-Based Encryption
In this section, we present a construction of SR-ABE, and analyze its security.
4.1 Construction
Assume that both the attribute space and the time space are Zp, and the message
space is G1. The proposed SR-ABE scheme, which is based on the CP-ABE
scheme in [20], consists of the following algorithms.
– Setup. This algorithm takes a security parameter λ as the input. It randomly
chooses a group G of prime order p with g ∈ G being the corresponding gen-
erator, and deﬁnes a bilinear map eˆ : G × G → G1. Additionally, it randomly
chooses u, h, u0, h0, w, v ∈ G, α ∈ Zp. Let rl be an empty list storing revoked
users and BT be a binary tree with at least N leaf nodes. Deﬁne two functions
F1 and F2 to map any element y in Zp to an element in G by F1(y) = uyh and
F2(y) = u0yh0. The public parameter is par = (g, w, v, u, h, u0, h0, eˆ(g, g)α)
along with rl and st, where st is a state which is set to be BT. The master
private key is msk = α.
– UserKG. This algorithm takes the public parameter par and an identity id
as the input. It randomly chooses β ∈ Zp, and outputs a private and public
user-key pair (skid, pkid) = (βid, gβid) for user id.
– PubKG. This algorithm takes the public parameter par, the master private
key msk, an identity id with a public key pkid and an attribute set A, and a
state st as the input. Let A1, ..., Ak be the elements of A. It ﬁrstly chooses
an undeﬁned leaf node θ from the binary tree BT, and stores id in this node.
Then, for each node x ∈ Path(θ), it runs as follows.
1. It fetches gx from the node x. If x has not been deﬁned, it randomly chooses
gx ∈ G, computes g′x = pkidα/gx, and stores gx in the node x.
2. It randomly chooses rx, rx,1, ..., rx,k ∈ Zp, and computes
Px,1 = g′x · wrx , Px,2 = grx , P (i)x,3 = grx,i , P (i)x,4 = F1(Ai)rx,i · v−rx .
3. It outputs pkAid = {x, Px,1, Px,2, P (i)x,3, P (i)x,4}x∈Path(θ),i∈[1,k] as the public
attribute-key and an updated state st.
– TKeyUp. This algorithm takes the public parameter par, the master private
key msk, a time period t, a revocation list rl and a state st as the input. For
all x ∈ KUNodes(BT, rl, t), it fetches gx (note that gx is always predeﬁned
in the PubKG algorithm) from the node x. It then randomly chooses sx ∈
Zp, and outputs the transformation key update information tkut = {x, Qx,1,
Qx,2}x∈KUNodes(BT, rl, t) where Qx,1 = gx · F2(t)sx , Qx,2 = gsx .
– TranKG. This algorithm takes the public parameter par, an identity id with a
public attribute-key pkAid and the transformation key update information tkut
as the input. Denote I as Path(θ), J as KUNodes(BT, rl, t). It parses pkAid as
{x, Px,1, Px,2, P (i)x,3, P (i)x,4}x∈I,i∈[1,k], tkut as {x, Qx,1, Qx,2}x∈J for some set of
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nodes I, J . If I ∩ J = ∅, it returns ⊥. Otherwise, for any node x ∈ I ∩ J , it
randomly chooses r′x, r
′
x,1, ..., r
′
x,k, s
′
x ∈ Zp, and computes
tk1 = Px,1 · Qx,1 · wr′x · F2(t)s′x = pkidα · wrx+r′x · F2(t)sx+s′x ,
tk2 = Px,2 · gr′x = grx+r′x , tk(i)3 = P (i)x,3 · gr
′
x,i = grx,i+r
′
x,i ,
tk
(i)
4 = P
(i)
x,4 · F1(Ai)r
′
x,i · v−r′x = F1(Ai)rx,i+r′x,i · v−(rx+r′x),
tk5 = Qx,2 · gs′x = gsx+s′x .
It outputs the transformation key tkid,t = (tk1, tk2, {tk(i)3 , tk(i)4 }i∈[1,k], tk5).
– Encrypt. This algorithm takes the public parameter par, an LSSS access struc-
ture (M, ρ), a time period t and a message M as the input. Let M be a l × n
matrix. It randomly chooses a vector −→v = (μ, y2, ..., yn)⊥ ∈ Znp . These values
will be used to share the encryption exponent μ. For i = 1 to l, it calculates
vi = Mi · −→v where Mi is the i-th row of M. In addition, it randomly chooses
μ1, ..., μl ∈ Zp, and outputs the ciphertext CT = ((M, ρ), t, C0, C1, {C(i)2 ,
C
(i)
3 , C
(i)
4 }i∈[1,l], C5) where
C0 = eˆ(g, g)αμ · M, C1 = gμ, C(i)2 = wvi · vμi ,
C
(i)
3 = F1(Ai)
−μi , C(i)4 = g
μi , C5 = F2(t)μ.
– Transform. This algorithm takes the public parameter par, an identity id with
a transformation key tkid,t over an attribute set A and a time period t and
a ciphertext CT over an access structure (M, ρ) and the same time period t
as the input. Suppose that A satisﬁes the access structure (M, ρ). Let I be
deﬁned as I = {i : ρ(i) ∈ A}. Denote by {wi ∈ Zp}i∈I a set of constants such
that if {vi} are valid shares of any secret μ according to M, then
∑
i∈I wivi
= μ. It parses CT, and outputs the transformed ciphertext CT′ = (C ′0, C0)
where
C ′0 =
∏
i∈I
(
eˆ(C(i)2 , tk2)eˆ(C
(i)
3 , tk
(i)
3 )eˆ(C
(i)
4 , tk
(i)
4 )
)wi
eˆ(C5, tk5)
eˆ(C1, tk1)
=
1
eˆ(g, pkidα)μ
.
– Decrypt. This algorithm takes the public parameter par, an identity id with
a private user-key skid and a transformed ciphertext CT′ as the input. It
outputs the message M as M = (C ′0)
1/β · C0.
– Revoke. This algorithm takes an identity id, a time period t, a revocation list
rl and a state st as the input. For all the nodes x associated with identity id,
it adds (x, t) to rl, and outputs the updated rl.
Notes and Comments. In the above scheme, g′x in the PubKG algorithm
can also be set as gα+βid/gx such that the KGC runs the UserKG algorithm
as follows. For each id, the KGC randomly chooses βid, r, r1, ..., rk ∈ Zp, and
outputs a private user-key skid = {K1, K2, K(i)3 , K(i)4 }i∈[1,k], where
K1 = gβid · wr, K2 = gr, K(i)3 = gri , K(i)4 = F1(Ai)ri · v−r.
Server-Aided Revocable Attribute-Based Encryption 583
However, this requires a secure channel between the KGC and each data user
for key transmission. In addition, the KGC possesses all secrets of data users.
Lastly, since this key structure follows that in the basic Rouselakis-Waters CP-
ABE scheme [20], each data user’s computational cost in decryption could not
be mitigated, and their storage sizes of private keys are linear to the numbers of
the attributes entitled to them.
Remark. Note that the techniques applied in our SR-ABE construction can be
used to realize other cryptographic primitives.
– Server-aided revocable KP-ABE. Since our SR-ABE construction uses the
same binary tree data structure as in the revocable KP-ABE scheme [1], it is
not diﬃcult to see that the technique of having an untrusted server to facilitate
computation used in our construction can be applied in a straightforward
manner to realize server-aided revocable KP-ABE.
– Server-aided revocable IBE with eﬃcient decryption. In our SR-ABE scheme,
we embed a public user-key into the attribute-key such that the server is
only able to partially decrypt a ciphertext, and leaves the partially decrypted
ciphertext to user for fully decryption using her private user-key. Such a gadget
can be easily adopted in the SR-IBE scheme in [19] to reduce data users’
decryption costs and remove secure channels for key distribution.
4.2 Security
Theorem 1. Under the decisional (q−1) problem, our SR-ABE scheme is selec-
tively IND-CPA secure.
Proof. The proof is divided into two cases. In Case 1, it is assumed that an
identity id∗ whose attribute set A∗ satisfying the challenge access structure
(M∗, ρ∗) is revoked at or before the challenge time period t∗. In Case 2, it is
assumed that an identity id∗ whose attribute set A∗ satisfying the challenge
access structure (M∗, ρ∗) is not revoked at or before the challenge time period
t∗. Brieﬂy speaking, the adversary is allowed to issue a private user-key query
on id∗ in Case 1, while this query is prohibited in Case 2. We detail the proof
in the full version of this paper6.
4.3 Comparison
To our knowledge, in addition to our work in this paper, [1,5,21,26] are also
revocable ABE schemes from bilinear pairings (excluding dual vector pairing
spaces [21]) in the prime-order groups. Recall that our goal in this paper is to
achieve indirect user revocation in a CP-ABE system by delegating data users’
workloads to an untrusted server such that the KGC indirectly accomplishes user
revocation by stopping updating the keys for revoked data users. In [5], a KP-
ABE scheme with indirect revocation is proposed where the KGC enables user
6 Please contact the authors for it.
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Table 1. Comparison between our SR-ABE scheme and existing revocable ABE
(R-ABE) schemes from standard bilinear pairings in the prime-order groups.
R-ABE in [5] R-ABE in [1] R-ABE
in [26]
R-ABE in
[21]
Our SR-ABE
Revocation
Mode
Indirect Indirect & Direct Direct Indirect Indirect
Type of ABE KP-ABE KP-ABE CP-ABE KP-ABE &
CP-ABE
CP-ABE
Server − − Semi-
trust
− Untrust
Key
Exposure
Resistance
No No − No Yes
Security Selective Selective Selective Selective Selective
Secure
Channel
Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Size of Key
Updates
O(R log(N
R
)) O(R log(N
R
)) − O(R log(N
R
)) O(R log(N
R
))
Size of Key
Stored by
Data User
O(l log N) O(l log N) O(1) O(l log N) &
O(k log N)
O(1)
Computation
Cost in
Decrypt
≥ 2(E + P) ≥ 3E + 4P E ≥ E + P E
revocation by stopping posting key update information for revoked data users,
thereby forcing revoked data users to be unable to update their decryption keys.
A hybrid revocable KP-ABE system is given in [1], which allows a data owner
to select either direct or indirect revocation mode when encrypting a message.
In [26], a revocable ABE scheme is put forth by giving the direct revocation
capability to a semi-trusted server, where the server shares part of the decryption
capability of the data users and stops the decryption operation for any revoked
data users. A generic way to realize ABE supporting dynamic credentials is
provided in [21], where the KGC indirectly accomplishes revocation by stopping
updating the keys for revoked data users.
Table 1 compares our SR-ABE scheme with revocable ABE schemes under
prime-order groups in [1,5,21,26]. Let N be the number of all data users, R be
the number of revoked data users, l be the number of attributes presented in
an access structure, and k be the size of the attribute set associated with an
attribute-key. Also, let “−” denote not-applicable, “E” denote exponentiation
operation, and “P” denote pairing operation, respectively. It is straightforward
to see from Table 1 that the schemes in [1,5,21] require secure channels between
the KGC and every data user for key transmission, and every data user to keep a
private key of which the size is determined by their attributes and the associated
nodes in the predeﬁned binary tree. While the scheme in [26] does not require
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every data user to store a key of large size but requires a secure channel between
the KGC and the semi-trusted server, and is subject to collusion attacks between
the semi-trusted server and revoked data users. Clearly, our SR-ABE scheme has
an edge over previous solutions in that it does not require any secure channels
between the system participants, and is secure against collusion attacks between
the untrusted server and revoked data users. Also, our SR-ABE scheme achieves
desirable eﬃciency in decryption run by data users, which only requires one
exponentiation operation.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we introduced a notion called server-aided revocable attribute-
based encryption (SR-ABE) to achieve eﬃcient user revocation in attribute-
based encryption (ABE). We formally deﬁned the (selective) IND-CPA security
for SR-ABE, proposed a concrete construction of SR-ABE in terms of ciphertext-
policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE), and then proved that the proposed
SR-ABE scheme is selectively IND-CPA secure. Compared with the previous
revocable ABE schemes, our SR-ABE scheme has three salient advantages. First,
our SR-ABE scheme delegates almost all computational overheads of data users
resulted in key updates to an untrusted server. Second, instead of storing a
private key, of which the size is logarithmic to the number of data users, by
each data user as in most of the existing revocable ABE schemes, each data user
in our SR-ABE scheme only needs to keep a private key of one group element.
Third, in our SR-ABE scheme, most of the computational cost in decryption is
delegated to the untrusted server, and a data user is only required to perform one
exponentiation operation to decrypt a ciphertext. Besides constructing server-
aided revocable CP-ABE schemes, the same techniques introduced in this paper
can be easily applied to build server-aided revocable key-policy ABE schemes
and IBE schemes.
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